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ABSTRACT
A blockcipher is a triple of algorithms, (G , E , D) where the key generation 
algorithm G on input l k produces a key; the encryption algorithm E  takes two 
inputs, a key and a message, and produces a ciphertext; and the decryption 
algorithm D reverses the process. A blockcipher is considered secure if it is 
indistinguishable from a random permutation. A tweakable blockcipher is a 
blockcipher with an additional input, a tweak. The tweak is not meant to be 
kept secret, and in fact may be public knowledge, but creates variability within 
the cipher. A tweakable blockcipher is considered secure if it is indistinguishable 
from a family of random permutations indexed by the tweak.
Tweakable blockciphers were first formalized by Liskov, Rivest and Wag­
ner, who constructed tweakable blockciphers directly from blockciphers [13]. 
Crump, Goldenberg, Hohenberger, Liskov, and Seyalioglu showed that tweakable 
blockciphers can be constructed directly from pseudorandom functions using a 
Feistel model [7]. Tweakable blockciphers have only been shown to be secure 
against polynomial-time adversaries, whereas the security of regular blockci­
phers has been proven against adversaries capable of launching generic attacks 
with certain specific exponential bounds. We analyze tweakable blockciphers in 
a comparable model, and present constructions that achieve a level of security 
equivalent to the best proven level of security blockciphers have attained.
Specifically, we prove that a tweak can be securely added to a seven-round 
Feistel construction for chosen-plaintext security, and that this construction is 
round optimal. We also prove that a tweak can be added to a ten-round Feistel 
construction for chosen-ciphertext security. In addition, we construct tweakable 
blockciphers that allow for longer tweak lengths; a tweak longer than the minimal 
size can be thought of as multiple tweaks. We prove that six rounds plus one 
round per tweak is sufficient for chosen-plaintext security, and eight rounds plus 
two rounds per tweak is sufficient for chosen-ciphertext security.
TWEAKABLE BLOCKCIPHERS SECURE AGAINST 
GENERIC EXPONENTIAL ATTACKS
Chapter 1
Introduction
Symmetric cryptography is a class of cryptography where a shared private key 
is used for both encryption and decryption. Blockciphers are symmetric ciphers 
which operate on a fixed-length string of bits, which are known as blocks. Specif­
ically a blockcipher is a function E  (the encryption algorithm) which takes a key 
K , where K  £ {0,1}* and a message M , and produces a ciphertext C, where 
M ,C  £ {0, l}n. More formally a blockcipher’s signature is:
E  : {0,l}fc x {0,l}n -* {0,l}n.
For each key K , E k  is a permutation on the domain {0, l}n . Since E x
is a permutation, for every ciphertext C there is exactly one message M  such
that E k {M) — C. E k  also has an inverse Dk  (the decryption algorithm)
such that for every message M, there exist a single ciphertext C such that
D k {C) — M . Thus for all messages and for all ciphertexts D k (Ek {M)) = M
2
and E k (Dk (C ))= C .
Theoretically, a blockcipher is secure if it is indistinguishable from a random 
permutation. However in practice, a blockcipher security is based on its key size. 
If the best known attack is better than a brute force attack over the key space, a 
blockcipher is sometimes considered to be insecure. For instance, some consider 
SHA-1 to be broken because it is possible to find a collision in better than brute 
force time, even though the best known attack still requires many operations 
(a brute force attack requires 2 8 0  hash operations while the best known attack 
requires 26 3  hash operations [31]).
Blockciphers, by design, only allow us to encrypt messages of size n. The 
most natural way to encrypt larger messages is to break a message M  into m  
blocks of size n; thus M  =  (M\, M 2 .. ■ Mm) and \M\ =  ran . 1 To encrypt a 
message, for all 1  < i < m, the ciphertext corresponding to Mi is calculated: 
E x(M i) — Ci, where the final ciphertext C — (C i,C 2  •.. Cm).2 However, it is 
obvious that there are major security concerns with this scheme: plaintext blocks 
that are equal encrypt to the same ciphertext. Obviously this is undesirable so 
in order to incorporate variability in the ciphertext we need to use modes of 
operations.
Modes of operations, such as Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode or Cipher
1If th e  size o f M  is not a m ultiple o f n  then  pad th e  last block in a d eterm in istic way such  
th a t th e  last block is o f size n.
2T h is schem e is known as E lectronic C ode Book m ode, however it is not very useful in 
practice because equal blocks encode to  th e  sam e ciphertexts, which is a m ajor security concern.
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Feedback (CFB) mode, allow us to encrypt messages of arbitrary length while 
adding variability to the ciphertext. In order to allow for randomness, modes 
use an initialization vector (also known as a nonce) as input, and this initial­
ization vector creates randomization within the ciphertext. This vector is not 
meant to be kept secret (in most modes) however it is important that the same 
initialization vector is not reused with the same key.
Tweakable blockciphers are blockciphers with an extra input, a tweak. The 
purpose of a tweak is to allow for variability within the blockcipher and is not 
meant to be kept secret. Therefore, by design, a tweakable blockipher inherently 
allows for randomness in the ciphertext. Changing the tweak should be an 
inexpensive operation, ideally only adding trivial cost. Tweakable blockciphers 
are considered secure if they are indistinguishable from a random permutation 
family.
Specifically a tweakable blockcipher is a function E  which takes a key K , a 
tweak T  and a message M , and produces a ciphertext C, where K  e {0, l} fc, 
T  6  {0, l} f and M ,C  G {0, l}n. The decryption algorithm, D takes as input K , 
T, and C and produces a messsage M. More formally a tweakable blockcipher’s 
signature is:
E  : {0, l} fc x {0, 1  }* x {0, l } n -> {0, l}n .
The first blockcipher to allow for an auxiliary input, called the spice, was 
the Hasty Pudding Cipher created by Rich Schroeppel [28]. Another cipher,
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the Mercy Cipher created by Paul Crowley [6 ] also allows for an additional 
input, called the randomiser, which creates variablity within the cipher. Tweak­
able blockciphers were thereafter formalized by Liskov, Rivest, and Wagner [13] 
who present two tweakable blockcipher constructions E k  derived from a regular 
blockcipher Ek -
1.1 Our W ork
An important open problem proposed by Liskov, Rivest, and Wagner from 
Crypto 2 0 0 2  was to incorporate tweaks into existing blockciphers or to create 
tweakable blockciphers directly [13]. Crump, Goldenberg, Hohenberger, Liskov, 
and Seyalioglu addressed their open problem by constructing tweakable block­
ciphers by XOR-ing a tweak into specific locations in a Feistel stream [7]. They 
believed that this is the most natural approach for adding tweaks to a Feistel 
blockcipher because it changes the cipher minimally. By XOR-ing the tweak 
into the dataflow instead of direct-cryptographically processing the tweak (e.g. 
hashing the tweak), the cost associated with changing the tweak value is mini­
mal. We also believe that this is the most natural approach to directly construct 
tweakable blockciphers from Feistel ciphers, and this is the model that we will 
use in our constructions.
Although tweakable blockciphers have been formally studied since 2002, the 
security of tweakable blockciphers have not been proven to the same high security
5
level as regular blockciphers. Blockciphers have been proven to be secure against 
adversaries able to make generic attacks with specific exponential bounds. Thus, 
an important open problem is to construct tweakable blockciphers that are as 
secure as the strongest regular blockciphers.
1.1.1 Our C on tributions
In this thesis, we construct tweakable blockciphers directly from Feistel ciphers. 
We prove that our constructions are secure against “exponential adversaries” 
-  adversaries allowed unlimited computations, but bounded by an exponential 
number of queries. We prove that seven rounds are sufficient to construct a 
chosen plaintext secure (CPA) tweakable blockcipher. We then show that ten 
rounds are sufficient to construct a chosen ciphertext secure (CCA) tweakable 
blockcipher. We are the first to prove security of tweakable blockciphers against 
a computationally unbounded adversary allowed q 2k queries, where k is 
half the input size. Our results match the best level of security proven for 
blockciphers [2 2 ].
We also explicitly address the problem of incorporating tweaks of arbitrary
length into a tweakable blockcipher. This is an important problem because
certain applications require different, specific tweak sizes. In many scenarios,
it makes sense for the tweak size to be the same size as the input or output.
In other applications, such as TAE mode, each tweak is designed to hold a
variety of information such that each tweak is unique [13]. It is also attractive
6
to allow for longer tweaks in order to allow for larger quantities of information, 
as this was the motivation for Schroeppel to allow spice values of 512 bits in 
the Hasty Pudding Cipher [28]. We prove that six rounds plus one round per 
tweak is sufficient for CPA security, and eight rounds plus two rounds per tweak 
is sufficient for CCA security.
1.2 B ackground and R elated  W ork
In this section we discuss tweakable blockciphers, Feistel blockciphers, and ex­
ponential adversaries.
1.2.1 T w eakable B lockciphers
The first blockcipher to allow for an auxiliary input, called the spice, was the 
Hasty Pudding Cipher created by Rich Schroeppel [28]. Another cipher, the 
Mercy Cipher created by Paul Crowley [6 ] also allows for an additional input, 
called the randomiser, which creates variablity within the cipher. Tweakable 
blockciphers were thereafter formalized by Liskov, Rivest, and Wagner [13] who 
present two tweakable blockcipher constructions E k  from a regular blockcipher 
E k '
E k (T ,M ) = Ek (T ® E k (M))
and
E K,h(T, m)  = E fc( M  ® h(T)) © h(T)
7
where K  is the key, T  is the tweak, M  is the message, and h is an e-almost 2-xor- 
universal hash function. All subsequent constructions of tweakable blockcipher 
have been created in this model, where a tweakable blockcipher is created using 
a regular blockcipher as a primitive [10], [10], [26], [5].
i
Tweakable blockciphers are important primitives which have many practi­
cal applications. Liskov, Rivest and Wagner show that tweakable blockciphers 
can be used to implement secure symmetric encryption [13], Halevi and Ro- 
gaway show that tweakable blockciphers have immediate applications to disk 
encryption, where the tweak is set to the memory address of an encrypted 
block [10],[11]. Thus two encrypted blocks storing the same data look completely 
different, even though the decryption of the blocks remains straightforward. Ad­
ditionally, Rogaway developed XEX mode which creates a tweakable blockcipher 
using a regular blockcipher [26]. In fact, XTS-AES (AES in XEX mode with ci­
phertext stealing3) is currently being considered by SISWG (Security in Storage 
Working Group) for the proposed IEEE disk encryption standard P1619 [30].
Tweakable blockciphers have also been studied in a variety of other contexts 
including the security against key related attacks [1 ], the security of tweakable 
modes [12], [16], efficiency [3], and other general constructions [5].
1 .2 .2  F eistel B lockciphers
3C iphertext stea ling  is a  m ethod for using m odes o f operations for encrypting m essages that 
are not evenly divisib le in to blocks w ithou t expanding  the  ciphertext.
L° R
Since their introduction almost thirty-five 
years ago, Feistel ciphers [9], also known 
as Feistel networks, have become the most 
actively studied class of blockciphers. The 
formula for the Feistel blockcipher on input 
M =  (L°,R°) is:
Li+i = R i
R i+1 =
where the output after n rounds is (Ln, R n), 
and each fa is a pseudorandom function spec­
ified by the key.
In their famous paper, Luby and Rackoff
showed that a three-round Feistel construc-
Figure 1.1: A 4-round Feistel block- 
tion is CPA secure and a four-round Feistel cipher.
construction is CCA secure against polyno­
mial adversaries [14]. A four-round Feistel cipher is illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
Lucks described an optimization for the CPA secure three-round Feistel con­
struction by replacing the first round with a universal hash function [15]. Shortly 
thereafter, Naor and Reingold provided optimizations for the strongly secure 
four-round cipher, replacing both the first and last rounds with a more general
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type of function [17]. In 2001, Ramzan [24] formally studied many variations 
on the Feistel construction. Most recently, Dodis and Puniya presented re­
sults about Feistel networks, including a combinatorial understanding of these 
constructions when the round functions are unpredictable rather than pseudo­
random [8 ].
Many common blockciphers are constructed in a Feistel model and include: 
DES [18], RC6  [25], Mars [4], Blowfish [27], and Lucifer [29].
1.2 .3  E xp on en tia l A dversaries
Thus far, the security of tweakable blockciphers have only been proven against 
polynomial adversaries. An adversary A is defined to be polynomial if A  runs in 
polynomial time. More formally, let P  be the set of all polynomial functions and 
let f be a function that outputs runtime. A is said to be polynomial if 3p G P  
such that t(A) < p(k), where k is the security parameter.
However, it is important to prove that tweakable blockciphers are as secure as 
possible. Therefore security is sometimes proven against a stronger adversary. 
We define an “exponential adversary” 4  A' as an adversary that is allowed an 
unlimited number of computations but is limited only to an exponential number
4A n adversary A  is defined to  be exponentia l if A  runs in exp on en tia l tim e. More formally, 
let E  be th e  set o f all exp on en tia l functions and let f be a  function th a t o u tp u ts runtim e. A  
is said to  be exponentia l if Be 6  E  such th a t t ( A )  <  e(k) ,  where k is th e  security param eter. 
However in th is thesis, we are using the  term  exponential  adversary  to  describe an adversary  
th a t is unbounded in th e  num ber of com p utations bu t lim ited  to  an exponentia l num ber of 
queries, specifically  q <C 2^ M^ 2 queries where \M \  is the  size o f th e  m essage.
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of oracle queries. Let us assume that the input size (the size of the message) is 
2k , then A! is allowed q <§C 2k oracle queries.
1.2 .4  E xp on en tia l S ecurity  o f  F eistel C iphers
The exponential security of Feistel blockciphers have been formally studied by 
Jacques Patarin [19], [20], [21], [22], [23]. Much of this thesis is based on Patarin’s 
work where he proved that against exponential adversaries [2 1 ]:
• a four-round Feistel construction is secure against known plaintext attacks,
• a seven-round Feistel construction is secure against chosen plaintext at­
tacks,
• and a ten-round construction is secure against chosen ciphertext attacks . 5
First he proved that four-rounds is KPA secure against an adversary that 
is allowed an unlimited number of computations but limited to q 2k queries. 
Not only did he show that a four-round Feistel cipher is KPA secure, but he also 
proved that it is secure against an adversary unable to make repeated queries, or 
unable to more than O(k) queries where the right half collide6. More formally, 
he showed that
5Patarin  then  later showed th a t a five-round Feistel cipher is both  CPA and CC A  secure 
against an exponentia l adversary, and also proved tha t th is construction  is round op tim al [22], 
However, in th is research, we use th e  proof m odel of his earlier work.
6In th is thesis, collide m eans th a t tw o different queries are equal on the  right half (or left 
h alf), and a  full collision im plies th a t tw o different queries are equal.
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Theorem  1.1 (Patarin’s KPA Secure Constructions) Let E  be a four-round 
Feistel cipher from 2k bits to 2k bits. Given q <C 2k inputs to E  and u G negl, 
if all inputs
1. are distinct with probability 1  — u(k)
2. and the probability of having I > 0 (k ) queries such that R q1 = Ro2 — 
R q3 — ...Rot is less than v(k)
then the output of E  is indistinguishable from a random for q <C 2k input queries.
Using Theorem 1.1 Patarin proved that a seven-round construction is CPA 
secure by breaking the construction into two constructions, F  and E, where F  
is the first three rounds and E  is the last four rounds.
Patarin proved that given q <C 2k chosen inputs to F, the outputs of F  were 
distinct with probability 1 - u(k) where v G negl, and that the probability that 
the right half did not collide more than 0 (k ) times was also 1 — u(k). Since the 
output of F  has the needed properties enumerated in Theorem 1.1 then E  o F  
is chosen ciphertext secure. More formally, he proved the following theorem:
Theorem  1.2 (Patarin’s CPA Secure Constructions) Let F  be a function
from 2k bits to 2k bits. If F  has the property that for q >C 2k queries, the
probability of having I > 0 (k ) indices such that Ri1 =  Ri2 =  Ri3 =  ...Ril is
u{k) where u G negl, (where Rij is the right half of the j ’th output of F), and
on distinct inputs to F, a full collision occurs with probability less than v{k),
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then E  o F  (where E  is a four-round Feistel function) is indistinguishable from 
random for q 2k input queries.
In order to prove that a ten-round Feistel construction is CCA secure, Patarin 
divided the ten-round construction into three different constructions, F, E  and 
F' where F  is the first three rounds, E  is the middle four rounds, and F' is the 
last three rounds. He showed that ten-rounds was CCA secure using by proving 
that the outputs of F  and F / _ 1  (since F' is used for chosen ciphertext queries 
we must consider the inverse of F') are distinct with probability 1  - u(k) where 
v G negl, and that the probability that the right half of the outputs do not 
collide more than 0 (k ) times is also 1  — u(k). More formally,
T heo rem  1.3 (P a ta r in ’s C C A  Secure C onstructions) Let F  andF' be func­
tions from 2k bits to 2k bits. I f  F  and F '~l each have the property that for 
q <C 2k queries, the probability of having I > 0 (k ) indices such that Ri1 — Ri2 = 
Ri3 =  ...Rit is v(k) where u G negl, (where Rij is the right half of the j  ’th output 
of F  or F '~ l), and on distinct inputs to F  (and F '~ l ), a full collision occurs 
with probability less than v{k), then F' o E o F ,  (where E  is a four-round Feistel 
function), is indistinguishable from random against chosen-ciphertext attack for 
q 2k queries.
Using Theorem 1 . 1  and subsequently Theorem 1.2 and Theorem 1.3 we are
able to prove that our seven-round tweakable blockcipher construction is CPA-
secure, our ten-round tweakable blockcipher construction is CCA-secure. We are
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also able to use these theorems to extend our tweakable blockcipher constructions 
to allow for longer tweaks.
When proving the security of specific constructions against generic attacks 
it is a standard assumption to treat pseudorandom permutations or functions 
as random ones [2], [3J. Specifically when proving the security against general 
attacks, the inner primitives are treated as a blackbox and the constructions 
are proven secure assuming that the inner primitives are secure. When proving 
the security of his Feistel constructions against exponential adversaries, Patarin 
assumed that the inner round functions were random instead of pseudorandom 
ones [19], [20], [21], [22], [23]. In our tweakable Feistel constructions, we also 
assume that the inner round functions are actually random.
14
Chapter 2
Definitions and N otation
In this section we discuss important definitions, and establish notation which 
are used thoughout this thesis.
2.1 B asic  N o ta tio n
2.1 .1  A dversaries
All adversaries in this thesis are assumed to be an exponential adversary unless 
otherwise explicitly stated. An adversary A  that is given access to an oracle 
O is written as AP\ an adversary given access to n  oracles, Oi, O2 , . . .  On, is 
written as A 0 l '°2' ■°n.
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2.1 .2  N eg lig ib le  F unctions
The expression u(k) where u G negl is used to denote a function u that is 
negligible in k , i.e. for any positive polynomial p and sufficiently large k, u(k) < 
o(l /p{k)).
The expression q <C 2k is equivalent to < v{k) where u G negl.
2.2 D efin ition s
A tweakable blockcipher is a triple of algorithms (G ,E ,D ) for key generation, 
encryption, and decryption, respectively. We restrict our attention to tweakable 
blockciphers where G(-), Ek(-,-), and D k (•,•) are all efficiently computable 
algorithms and where the correctness property holds; that is, for all messages 
M , all tweaks T, and for all keys K  G G (lk), D k (E k { M ,T ) ,T )  — M. We also 
generally assume that G (lk) draws keys uniformly at random from {0,1 }p^  for 
some polynomial p.
In this thesis, we assume that the size of the tweak is half the size of the 
message unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Security is defined in terms of an exponential adversary, where an exponential 
adversary is allowed an unlimited number of computations, but is bounded by 
an exponential number of queries. More formally,
D efin ition  2 . 1  An adversary A is exponential if it is allowed an unlimited
number of computations but bounded by q queries, where for all messages M ,
16
\M\ =  2k and q 2fc.
The security of tweakable blockciphers can be defined over the maximum 
advantage that an adversary can obtain with access to an unknown oracle which 
returns encryption queries from either a random permutation family or a tweak- 
able blockcipher; we define this advantage as ADV-TBC«-
D efinition  2 . 2  Over all adversaries with access to an encryption oracle, the 
maximum advantage is defined as:
ADV-TBCK{E,D ,q,t)  = max : | P r [ ^ (v)( l fc) =  1 ] -  Pr[.An(v)( lfc) =  1]|
where (1 ) for all k, K  is generated by G (lk), (2 ) IT(-, •) is a random permutation 
family parameterized by its second input, and (3) A  is allowed to run for t steps 
and make at most q oracle queries.
Stronger security of tweakable blockciphers can also be defined over the max­
imum advantage that an adversary can obtain with access to an unknown oracle 
which returns encryption and decryption queries from either a random permuta­
tion family or a tweakable blockcipher; we define this advantage as ADV-STBCk-
D efinition 2.3 Over all adversaries with access to an encryption and decryp­
tion oracle, the maximum advantage is defined as:
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ADV-STBCk(£ , D, q, t ) =  max : (v)( lfc) =  1 ] -
P r[^ n(v)’n“ 1 (v)( lfc) =  1]|
where (1 ) for all k, K  is generated by G (lk), (2 ) II, II - 1  is a random permutation 
family and its inverse, and (3) A  is allowed to run for t steps and make at most 
q oracle queries.
We have two notions of security: (1 ) chosen-plaintext secure (CPA) and (2) 
chosen-ciphertext secure (CCA). Both levels of security are defined in terms of 
an exponential adversary. We first define CPA security:
D efinition  2.4 A tweakable blockcipher is CPA exponentially secure if for all 
k and t, ADV-TBCk(E ,D ,q ,t)  is negligible in k, where q is some exponential 
function of k. More formally, a tweakable blockcipher is CPA secure if 
Vfc, V£, Vg 2fc, ADV-TBCk(E ,D ,q ,t)  < u(k) where u G negl.
We define CCA security in the same manner.
D efin ition  2.5 A tweakable blockcipher is CCA exponentially secure if for all 
k and t, ADV-STBCk(E ,D ,q ,t)  is negligible in k, where q is some exponential 
function of k. More formally, a tweakable blockcipher is CCA secure if 
\/k, V£, Vg 2 k, ADV-STBCk(£, D, q, t) < u(k) where u G negl.
2.3 T w eakable B lockcipher N o ta tio n
R
Let us establish some notation so that we can 
discuss how to add tweaks to a Feistel cipher. 
We use the same notation used by Crump et 
al. [7]. Let
• n be the number of random functions used 
in Feistel cipher, also referred to as the 
number of rounds.
• M  be a message where M  — (L°, R°) such 
that L° is the left half of the input, and 
R° is the right half. The size of M  is 2k; 
in other words \M\ — 2k, while the size of 
both L° and R° is k.
• C be the ciphertext where C =  (Ln,R n).
Unless otherwise specified, each tweak we refer Figure 2 .1 : An illustration of
A4 ; the locations at which to 
to are a half-block in length; that is, on input M  X0R a tweak of ,ength | M j / 2  for
4-round Feistel blockcipher.
of size 2k, the tweak is of size k. As we will later 
see, a blockcipher may allow for longer tweaks.
We can think of these as “multiple tweaks,” as conceptually, the longer tweak
can be thought of as being composed of multiple tweaks, each of the same size.
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•0.5
•2.5
3.5
For an n-round Feistel cipher, a tweak can conceivably be XOR-ed in at any 
of the following unique locations: Cq, £ i, . . 11$, 7£o.s, • • •, 7^n-o.5> T^ n-
Let this set of all of these locations be denoted by An. We illustrate A3 (the set 
of all possible tweak locations in 3-rounds) in Figure 2 .1 .
Let T x be the XOR of all the tweaks used at location A G An. The formula 
for our construction is:
Li+1 =  W  © Tni
R i+1 =  f i+i{W  © TUi © Tni+0 b) @ L1 @ T Ci
Let “BC(n, A)” refer to the tweakable blockcipher construction where the 
number of Feistel rounds is n and a tweak T x is XOR-ed in at some location 
A G An. To denote adding t different tweaks, we write “BC{n, Ai , . . . ,  At)”, where 
T Xi =  Ti is the tweak for location A* and different locations each have their own
independent tweak. Thus, in such a construction, the tweak size is tk.
We might also want to denote adding the same tweak value at multiple 
locations. We write this as “BC(n, Ai +  A2 )”, where the implication of using the 
compound location Ai +  A2  is that T Al =  T x2. Of course, we may also consider a 
construction with multiple tweaks, each of which may be a compound location; 
we use the obvious notation for this. We use the symbol T to denote a (possibly) 
compound tweak location.
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In An, we have listed all tweaks at “.5” locations, that is TZi+o.s for some I. 
However, as Crump et al. proved, we do not have to consider these locations [7].
L em m a 2 . 1  For all m, 7 7 .m+o.5  is equivalent to R m +  Cm+1 -
Proof:
Suppose we start with inputs Lm and Rm. From the formulas,
jT,m + 1 =  0
R m + 1 =  f m + 1 (R m © T n ™ © T Um+0-5) © Lm 0  T Cm 
Lm + 2  = f m+i (Rm © T nrn © T ^ m+0 5) © Lm © T Cm © T nm + 1  
R m+2 = / m+2 (Lm+2 © T ^ m+1 5 ) ©i ? m © T ^ m © T ^ 1
Note that in both the formula for Lm+2  and for Rm+2, T nm + 0  5 always ap­
pears in an © with T ^ m, and the only other place T-jim appears is with T Cm+1 
(canceling each other out). Thus, using 7 7 .m+o.5  as a tweak location is the same 
as using the combination of 7Zm and £ m+i instead.
■
Another simple observation from Crump et al. [7] is that adding a tweak at 
location £ m is equivalent to adding a tweak to location lZm+i.
L em m a 2 . 2  For all 0 < m  < n, Cm is equivalent to 77.m+i.
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Proof: Suppose we start with inputs Lm and R m. From the formulas,
j ^ m + l  __ j^ r n  0  rjplZm
R m + 1  = f m+i{Rm © T Um © T Um+0-5) © Lm 
From the formulas, L m + 1  is not affected by any tweaks at either Cm or
R m + l is affected by both Cm and lZm+i. Therefore applying a tweak in either 
location has the same effect on Lm + 1 and Rm+1.
■
Since Cm and 7?.m+i are equivalent, we will sometimes use them interchange­
ably. From Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 we are able to reduce the set of possibly tweak­
able locations which includes tweaks at £ n, IZo, . . . ,  7Zn and all combinations 
thereof.
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Chapter 3
CPA-Secure Tweakable 
Blockciphers
Now that we have introduced all necessary definitions and notation, we can 
construct a CPA-secure tweakable blockcipher from a Feistel cipher. Crump et 
al. proved that all tweakable blockciphers constructed from a six-round Feis­
tel cipher in our model is insecure against exponential adversaries [7]. Thus 
possible tweakable blockcipher constructions which are CPA-secure against an 
exponential adversary must include at least seven random functions. In fact, 
seven rounds is enough to create a secure tweakable blockcipher; 30(7,71^ + £ 3 ) 
is a secure construction and is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
T heorem  3.1 BC(7 , 77-3 +  £ 3 ) is CPA-secure for q <C 2 k queries.
Proof:
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In order to prove that BC(7,7Zs +  £ 3 ) is a secure tweakable blockcipher we 
decompose our seven-round construction into two functions, F  and E , where F  
is the first three rounds, including the XOR-ed tweak at both £ 3  and 72-3,1 and 
E  is the last four rounds. It is obvious that E  is a regular four-round Feistel 
function. To prove that F  has the properties enumerated in Theorem 1.2, we 
need to prove that the probability of two different outputs being equal is small 
and the probability that the right side of two different outputs being equal is 
also small. More formally, we need to prove lemma 3.1.
L em m a 3.1 F is constructed such that for any two distinct queries, the proba­
bility of the outputs being equal is 0 (2 ~2k) and the probability of the right halves 
of the outputs being equal is 0 (2 ~k).
Proof: We show here that given two queries, the probability of an equality in 
the right half of the output is at most 2~k+l, and that the probability of both 
outputs being equal is at most 2 ~2k+1.
We call two queries L°, R °, T  and L'°, R'°, T' respectively. We also assume 
that these queries are distinct, that is either L° ^  Z/°, or R° 7  ^R r0, or T  ^  T ' . 
For ease of notation, we define 5R1 as R 1 © R'1, and Sfi(Rl) =  f i(R l) © f i (R n)\ 
we also define 8 L 1 and 5Ti similarly.
Thus we need to prove that the probability that SR3  © 5T =  0 (i.e. the 
right halves of the outputs are equal) is 0 (2 ~k) and that the probability that
1A lthough  C 3 is equivalent to  (by lem m a 2.2), we can think of th is construction  as using  
£ 3 , so th a t we can conceptually  sp lit th e  function  th is way.
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8 R 3 © 8T  =  0 and 8 L 3  © 8T  — 0 (i.e. both outputs are equal) is 0(2 2k).
Since the queries are unique, we can divide this proof into three cases, 8 R° ^  
0, 5R° = 0 but 5L° ^  0, and 5R° = SL° = 0 and 5T ^  0.
C ase 1 : 5R° /  0. In order for the right half of the outputs to be equal, 
8 R 3  © 8T  =  0, we know that 5fi(R°) — SL° © 8 f s (R 2) © 5T. Since 5R° ^  0 and 
f i  is a random function, 8 fi(R°)  is a random value. Therefore the probability 
that 5fi(R°) =  8 L° © 5f$(R2) © <5T, which corresponds to the probability that 
the right half of any two outputs are equal, is 2 ~k.
In order for 8 L 3 © 5T — 0, (i.e. the left halves of the outputs are equal), we 
know that 6 f 2 (L°® f i ( R 0)) = 8 R°® 8T. l f 8 L°® 8 f i(R°) ^  0, 8 f 2 {L°®fi{R0)) = 
5R°®8T  only occurs with probability 2~k. Furthermore, given this and because 
SL° ® 8 fi(R°) — 5R2, the probability that 5fs(R2) — 5fi(R°)®8L° ®5T  is 2~k , 
and therefore, the probability of a full collision is 2 ~2k.
However, 8 L° © 8 fi(R°) = 0 occurs with probability 2~k. In that case, 
in order to have 8 L 3  © 8 T  =  0, we must have 8 T  — 8 R°. If 8 R 3  © 8T  =  0 
as well, we know 8 f\(R°)  =  8 L° © 8 f s (R 2) © 8T, but since 8 L° = 8 f\(R°)  in 
this case, this implies that 8 f s (R 2) — 8T  — 8 R° 7  ^ 0, yet, this can occur with 
probability at most 2~k. Therefore, the probability of an overall collision is at 
most 2 {2 ~2k) — 2 ~2k+1.
C ase 2: 8 R° = 0 and 8 L° ^  0. In order for 8 R 3 © 8 T  =  0, 8 fs (R 2) =
8 f i(R°)  © 8 L° © 8T  must hold. Note that 8 R 2 — 8 R° © 8 f 2 (R1) =  8 f 2 (R l ), and
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8 R 1 =  5L° © 8 f i(R°) — SL° ^  0. If SR2 0, there is a collision on the right 
only with probability 2~k. However, the probability that SR2 = 0 is 2~k, so the 
probability of a collision on the right is at most 2  • 2 ~k.
In order for the SL3 © ST = 0 to be true, we must have Sf2 (L° © f i ( R 0)) — 
5R° ©<5T =  ST. Because 8 L° ^  0 and Sfi(R°) =  0, Sf2 (L °® fi (R 0)) is random. 
Therefore the equation is true with probability 2~k , therefore the probability of 
the left halves of the output being equal is 2 ~k.
If the left halves are equal, we know that 8 f 2 (RI1) =  ST. Recall that SR2 — 
Sf2 (R1), so if ST =  0, then SR2 =  0. Thus SR3 © ST =  SL° ^  0. However, 
if ST ^  0 then the probability that SR3 = ST is at most 2~k. Therefore, the 
overall probability of a collision in this case is at most 2 ~2k.
C ase 3: SR° =  0 and SL° =  0. This case is trivial. Since the message queries 
are equal, SR3 =  SL3 =  0. However, ST ^  0, therefore SR3®ST = SL3®ST ^  0. 
Therefore the outputs are never equal in either half of the output.
Thus, the overall probability that two distinct queries will have the same 
output is at most 0 (2 “ 2fc) and the probability that the right half of the outputs 
will be equal is at most 0{2~k). Thus, we have proven Lemma 3.1. ■
So long as the queries the adversary makes do not produce a full collision 
on F  or a multi-collision on the right half of the output of F, the responses 
are indistinguishable from random. Therefore, the queries of the adversary are 
independent of the outputs of F  so long as the required conditions hold. By
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Lemma 3.1, the probability of an overall collision in q <C 2k queries is 0(q 22~2k), 
which is negligible. Similarly, the probability of an /-way multi-collision on the 
right is 0(q l2 ~(l~ ^ k) — 0(2k(q2~k)1), which is less than 0((q21~k)1). Since 
(q2 1~ k ) 1 is negligible, the probability of an /-way multi collision on the right is 
negligible. Thus, F  satisfies the necessary properties with all but a negligible 
probability, which completes our proof of Theorem 3.1. ■
Since we have proved that BC(7,72-3 +  £ 3 ) is a seven-round tweakable block­
cipher that is CPA-secure against exponential adversaries, and Crump et al. 
showed that all constructions with six or fewer rounds are insecure against com­
parable adversaries, our construction is round optimal in our model.
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F i g u r e  3 . 1 : A n  i llu s tr a tio n  o f  
BC{7,TZ3  +  £ 3 ) ;  a  se v e n -r o u n d  
e x p o n e n t ia lly  C P A -se c u r e  tw ea k ­
a b le  F e is te l b lo ck c ip h er .
28
Chapter 4
CCA-Secure Tweakable 
Blockciphers
In this chapter we construct tweakable blockiphers which are CCA-secure against 
exponential adversaries. We prove that BC(10, £ 3  +  7 ^ 3  +  £ 7  +  7 ^7 ) illustrated 
in Figure 4.1 is a ten round CCA-secure tweakable blockcipher.
T heorem  4.1 BC( 10, £ 3  +  7 ^ 3  +  £ 7  +  F 7 ) is CCA-secure for q 2 k queries.
Proof: In order to prove that BC( 10, £ 3  +  7 ^ 3  -f £ 7  +  TZj) is CCA-secure against 
exponential adversaries, we use Theorem 1.3. In our construction, the first three 
rounds, including the tweaks at £ 3  and 72-3, form F, and the last three rounds, 
including the tweaks at £ 7  and form F '. Thus BC( 10, £ 3  +  7 ^ 3  +  £ 7  +  7^7 ) = 
F' o E  o F. F / _ 1  is identical to F, except with distinct random round functions. 
Both F  and F'~l meet the properties of Theorem 1.3, as we have shown in
29
our proof of Lemma 3.1. Since F, E, and F' have the properties given in 
Theorem 1.3, BC( 10, £ 3  +  7 ^ 3  +  £ 7  +  TZj is CCA-secure against an exponential 
adversary bounded by q <^i 2 k queries. ■
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F i g u r e  4 . 1 : A n  i l lu s tr a tio n  o f  
B C {  10, C3  + 7^ -3 4- C,y +  7^-7); & ten -  
ro u n d  e x p o n e n tia lly  C C A -se c u r e  
tw ea k a b le  F e is te l b lo ck c ip h er .
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Chapter 5
Longer Tweaks
In this chapter, we demonstrate that secure (both CPA-secure and CCA-secure) 
tweakable blockciphers exist with arbitrary tweak length at the cost of one addi­
tional round per half-block of tweak, and that the constructions we give for CPA 
security are round-optimal, where the security is proved against an exponential 
adversary. We prove in Section 5.2 that CPA-secure tweakable blockciphers exist 
with arbitrary tweak length at the cost of one additional round per half-block of 
tweak. We then prove that this construction is round-optimal in our model. We 
then demonstrate in Section 5.3 that CCA-secure tweakable blockciphers exist 
with arbitrary tweak length at the cost of two additional rounds per half-block 
of tweak. (The optimality of this construction is an open problem.)
First, we discuss several general lemmas about the security multiple tweak 
and compound tweak locations first stated by Crump et al. [7] in Section 5.1.
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5.1 G eneral L em m as
In order to prove security for longer tweaks, we need to adopt additional nota­
tion. The notation used in this section was adopted by Crump et al. [7]. Let 
A* be the set of all compound tweak locations1 over An.
In this section, we review general lemmas from Crump et al. that can be 
used for both CPA and CCA security.
Lemma 5.1 For all n and T i , .. .  , I \  € A*, if BC(n,  T i , . . . , T*) is secure, then 
for alii = 1 to t, B C (n ,T i ) is secure.
Proof: We prove this contrapositively; let j  € [l,t] be such that BC( n,T j )  is 
insecure. We can attack B C ( n , T i , . . .  , T t) by following the attack on BC(n,Tj ) ,  
but setting all tweaks other than Tj to 0 fc. ■
We can define T =  ]T)iesr K, where Sr  is the set of locations used in T. If 
we do so, then clearly T +  T' =  Y i e s r&Sr, ^  where A represents symmetric 
difference. Crump et al. also proved a generalization of Lemma 5.1.
Lemma 5.2 For all n and I f i , . . . , T t £  A*, if BC(n, T i , .. .  , I \ )  is secure, then 
for all ^ ^  S  C (1 , . . . ,  t}, BC(n, Y^ies^i) secure.
: A  com pound tweak location  is w hen the  sam e tw eak is X O R -ed in m ultiple locations in 
th e  Feistel stream .
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Proof: If not, let 5 be such that BC(n, YlieS insecure- We can attack 
BC(n, T i , . . . ,  Tt) by following the attack on BC(n, by setting all tweaks
Tj for j  $ S  equal to 0, and all tweaks Ti for i G S  equal to each other. ■
Another observation from Crump et al. is that if using the same tweak in 
multiple locations, then at least one location must be secure.
Lemma 5.3 (Com binations W ith The Same Tweak) For alln and Ai , . . . ,  Ar G
An, BC(n, Ai  bAr ) is secure, then Ai G {7^2 > • • • , 7 £n-2 } for some 1 < i < r.
Proof: Since without loss of generality, all Ai are in {IZ2 , ■ ■ ■ the only
way the condition is not met is if all Ai are lZn-i-  If r is even, the construction 
is equivalent to BC(n,$), while if r is odd, the construction is equivalent to 
B C ^ iH n - i) ,  both of which are insecure. ■
These three lemmas apply for any type of security.
5.2 L onger T w eaks w ith  C P A  S ecurity
In this section we construct a Feistel-based tweakable blockcipher CPA secure 
against an exponential adversary with a fixed arbitrary sized tweak. For t half­
blocks of tweak, we construct a Feistel-based tweakable blockcipher in t +  6  
rounds that is CPA secure.
We construct a tweakable blockcipher with longer tweaks similarly to the way 
we constructed tweakable blockiphers in Chapter 3 with “normal” sized tweaks.
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We break our tweaked Feistel cipher into two ciphers, F  and E, where F  is a 
t -f- 2  round function which includes all tweaks XOR-ed into the datastream 2  and 
meets the properties required from Theorem 1.2 and E  is a regular four-round 
Feistel cipher.
5.2 .1  C on stru ctin g  F
The construction of F  is not as simple as we would have liked, and therefore 
we give the intuition of how to construct F  so that it meets the properties of 
Theorem 1.2 and why simpler attempts fail at meeting these required properties. 
Remember, we must construct F  such that with g «  2 k distinct queries
1. the probability that any two outputs collide is u(k) where u G negl and
2. the probability that there are I > 0 (k) outputs such that the right halves 
collide is v(k) where v G negl.
For all possible constructions of F, we start adding tweaks at location £i+2  
since tweaks included at locations involving only at Ci and/or £ 2  allow for a 
full collision attack, as we will explain in Section 5.4. Therefore £ \  and/or £ 2  
are not useful as the sole location of a tweak.
All tweaks are included on the left only for simplicity of presentation: apart 
from the tweak included at £ t+2 , all tweaks could be included on the right 
instead.
2For exam ple, in C hapter 3, w hen there was only 1 tweak, F  was three rounds.
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F irs t A tte m p t C o n stru c tin g  F
The simplest construction of F  is for all 1 < i < t include tweak Ti at location
A + 2 -
This construction obviously does not meet the requirements of Theorem 1.2 
because the right half of the output is not affected by the last tweak. Thus 
it is easy to force collisions on the right by querying the cipher with the same 
message and the same Ti for all 1 < i < t — 1 but vary Tt. Because Tt never 
effects the right side of F ’s output, all queries will collide on the right. Since F  
fails at meeting the requirements, we need to consider a different F  construction.
Second A tte m p t C o n stru c tin g  F
We constructed F  in Chapter 3 so that it was able to meet the requirements 
for one tweak. Intuitively, we should build on that construction, to allow for 
multiple tweaks; we construct F  such that for all 1  < i < t include tweak Ti at 
location £*+2 , and also at the following location:
• If i = t, then also include Ti at lZt+2 -
Since this construction is similar to F  constructed for a single tweak in 
Chapter 3, it would appears to be a likely candidate for a “good” F. However, 
if equal tweaks appeared at both Li and Li+2 , by Lemma 2.1 that would be 
equivalent to having only one tweak at R4+0.5 . Crump et al. proved that having 
a tweak only appear Ri+0 .5  for any i is insecure [7]. In order to attack this
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construction, we query F  with 2 fc/ 2  different messages, where L° and R° remains 
constant, for any constant 1 < c < t let Tc = Tc_2 , and for all 1 < i < t such 
that i ^  c and i ^  c — 2, fix Ti. Therefore, all queries are identical except at 
locations £ c - 2  and Cc which is equivalent to all queries being identical except 
at location R c- 1 .5  (from Crump et al.). Thus, the internal values stay constant 
until the input to f c- 1 - Since we have made 2 fc/ 2  queries to an ideal round 
function, by the birthday bound, we can expect with non-negligible probability 
to get a collision on the output of / c_ 1 for two different queries. If we get such a 
collision, the entire output ciphertext will collide. Therefore this F  construction 
does not meet the properties, and we need to consider a different F  construction.
Since the previous construction didn’t meet the required properties, we might 
also consider extending our construction of F  from Chapter 3 such that for all 
1  < i < t, add a new round and XOR Ti into the stream at both Ci+ 2  and 7^ + 2 - 
Thus the construction of F  for all 1 < i < t includes tweak Ti at location Ci+2 - 
and
• for all i include Ti at 7£j+2 -
This construction is also insecure, because for any two queries, (L°, R°, T\ , . . .  Tt) 
and (L'0 ,R '° ,T [ , .. .T/), such that L° = L'°, R° = R f0, for all 1 < i < t -  2 
Ti =  T/, and Tt~\ © Tt =  T[_x © T/, the probability to get a full collision is
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0(2 k). Therefore, by the birthday bound, with q <C 2k queries we can expect 
full collisions with non-negligible probability.
T h ird  A tte m p t C o n stru c tin g  F
Since simpler constructions did not meet the requirements, we considered adding 
two new rounds for each tweak. Let F  be a construction such that for all 
1 < i < t ,
• Ti is included at K 1+2*i •
• Ti is included at £ 1 +2 *i-
This construction is the first construction to seemingly meet all of the re­
quirements from Theorem 1.2; however this construction requires 2£ + 1 rounds 
which becomes inefficient very quickly and is far from optimal. Therefore, we 
need to find another way to construct F.
F o u rth  A ttem p t C o n stru c tin g  F
The problem with the second construction is that when two equal tweaks are 
used two rounds apart, there is an attack. A way to resolve this problem is to 
construct F  such that two equal tweaks can never be placed two rounds apart. 
Thus a simple solution would be to construct F  such that for all 1  < i < t use 
tweak T{ at the following location:
• If i = 0 mod 2 (i is even), then include Ti at £ 2 * 1  •
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• If % =  1 mod 2 (i is odd), then include Ti at £ 2 *1+1 .
• If i — t, then include T) at 7 ^ + 2 -
This construction also seems to meet the requirements of Theorem 1 .2 , how­
ever on average this construction adds about two rounds per tweak, and like the 
previous construction is far too inefficient. Therefore we need to consider how 
to construct F  so that it meets the required properties and is more efficient.
Fifth A ttem pt Constructing F
Thus far, we have been constructing F  to avoid the following two attacks: an 
adversary can easily force a collision on the right half of the output because 
the right side isn’t affected by the last tweak, or the adversary can force a full 
collisions because two different equal tweaks can placed two rounds apart. In 
order to avoid the first attack, we can place the last tweak at location 7lt+2 > but 
we have not yet constructed F  to efficiently avoid the second attack.
However, we have not yet constructed F  to include any tweaks at £ 1  or at
£ 2 . Although these locations are not secure on their own, adding tweaks at £ 1
or £ 2  that are also included at other locations prevents the second attack (since 
tweaks will no longer be used only at a single location). We think of £ 1  and £ 2  
as riders since every tweak used at these locations are also included elsewhere.
Therefore we construct F  for all 1 < i < t to include tweak Ti at location 
£j+ 2 , and also at the following locations:
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• If i =  0 mod 4, then also include Ti at £ 2 .
• If % =  3 mod 4, then also include Ti at C\.
• If i =  £, then also include Ti at 7lt+2-
This construction avoids the equivalent tweak attack by adding a compound 
location at £ 1  and £ 2 • By adding the riders at L\ and £ 2  we avoid any attack 
that occurs when two tweaks are only used at two individual locations which are 
two rounds apart. Thus every other odd tweak, beginning with £ 3 , is included 
at £ 1  (for l < i < £ ,  i f i  =  3 mod 4 use Ti at location £ 1 ) and every other even 
tweak, beginning with T4  is included at £ 2  (for 1 < z < £, if i =  0 mod 4 use Ti 
at location £ 2 ) .
Unfortunately, this construction is also susceptible to attack if we aren’t 
careful: if Tt is used at 7 ^ + 2  and not included in a rider, and Tt- 1 is used only 
at Ct+i, by Lemma 2.2 the tweaks effectively occur at the same spot. Therefore, 
an adversary can easily force collisions on the right by querying with identical
messages and tweaks except for tweaks Tt- 1 and Tt . If an adversary varies Tt- 1
and Tt such that Tt- 1 02* =  c for some constant c, all outputs of F  will collide on 
the right. Therefore, in some cases, namely when Tt -  1 and Tt are not included 
in riders, an adversary is able to force collisions on the right.
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5.2 .1 . 1  F inal C o n stru c tio n  of F
In order to avoid the attack that the fifth construction of F  is susceptible to, we 
adjust the only case when there is a problem, namely when t = 2 mod 4. We 
construct F  for all 1 < i < t to include tweak Ti at location £*+2 , and also at 
the following locations:
•  If i =  0 mod 4, then also include Ti at £ 2 .
•  If i =  3 mod 4, then also include T i  at C \ .
• If i — t, then also include Ti at 1Zt+2-
• If % =  t and t =  2 mod 4, then also include Tt at £ 1 .
This construction of F  requires only f-f 2  rounds, which is much smaller than 
other possibly secure constructions. F  with six half blocks of tweak is illustrated 
in Figure 5.1.
In the next section we prove that F  meets the properties of Theorem 1.2 and 
the minimality of F  is proven in Section 5.4.
5 .2 .2  P rov in g  F ’s correctn ess
In this section we prove that F  has the properties needed from Theorem 1.2; i.e.
given unique queries that it is “hard” to get collisions on the right half of the
output, and that it is “even harder” to get full collisions on the output.
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In order to prove that F  has the required properties, we introduce the fol­
lowing additional notation:
• Let To be ©i= 0  mod 4 - i^’
• If t =  2  mod 4 then define T_i to be Tt ©i= 3  mod 4  Tp, 
otherwise, define T_i to be ©z=3 mod4 ^ -
• Let Tev =  ®[J 0 ]T2i.
.  Let Tod =  ®ii‘t 1 )/2 Jr 2i+1.
• Let Tte be Tt if t  is even, and 0 otherwise.
• Let Tto be Tt if t is odd, and 0 otherwise.
We are also reusing the <5 notation defined in Chapter 3 where 8Rl as 
Sfi(R l) =  fi(R l) © fi(R H), and 6Ll and STi is defined similarly..
First, we focus on the probability of a full collision on the outputs of F  given 
two distinct queries.
Theorem  5.1 On any pair of distinct inputs, the probability that F  will produce 
the same output on each is 0(2~2k).
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Proof: In order for two unique queries to yield a full collision of F, we must 
have the following two equations:
0 = 6R°<l>6Tt ee 6 T od<B6f2(R1) ® 6 f i (R3) ® . . . e 6 h y tm+2(R2W +l)
0 =  SL° © STto 0  STev ® 5h (R°) ® Sh(R 2) ® ■ • • ® « /2L(t+i)/2j+i ( f l2L(t+1)/2J)
where the first equation corresponds to the left side of the output if there are 
an odd number of tweaks and the right side of the output if there are an even 
number of tweaks; the second equation corresponds to the left side of the output 
if there are an even number of tweaks and the right side of the output if there 
an odd number of tweaks.
Note that for every 0 < i < t — 1 R l is involved in one of the two equations 
above; If i is odd, R l is involved in the first equation, while if i is even Rl is 
involved in the second equation. We break the proof into the following three 
cases:
C ase 1 : There is an even i < t +  2 such that SR1 ^  0, and there is an odd 
j  < t+ 2  such that 5Ri ^  0. In this case, the probability that the first equation is 
true is 2~k and the probability that the second equation is true is 2~k. Therefore 
the probability that both equations are true is 2~2k.
C ase 2 : For all i < t +  2, 5Rl — 0. If this is the case, it is easy to see that 
5R° =  0, and 8L° = 0 (since 8Rl — Sfi(R°) 0  SL°). Furthermore, for each
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1  < i < t +  1 , 0  =  8 R i + 1  =  6fi+i{& ) © 51? = 0  © 5U = 5R<“ 1 © ST.i_ 2  =  <5T»_2. 
Therefore, all the tweak values must also remain constant up to Tt- \ .  But if 
both L° and R° are the same, and all the tweak values up to T t-\ are the same, 
then the difference on the right of the output will be the difference in Tt , so if 
there is a collision, 5Tt =  0. Therefore, both queries are the same. Thus the 
probability of two distinct queries leading to this case is 0 .
Case 3: Either for all odd i < t +  2 or for all even i < t +  2, SR1 =  0, but there 
is some j  < t such that 6Ri ^  0. This covers all remaining cases, but this case 
is the hardest one to prove. A priori, one of the two equations may be true with 
probability 1, while the other equation is true with probability 2~k. However, 
as we will prove in Lemma 5.4, a full collision can only occur with very low 
probability or a full collision only occurs when two inputs were identical.
Lemma 5.4 In two distinct queries to F  for which either for all odd i < t + 2 
or for all even i < t +  2, 5Rl =  0, but 3j < t such that SRi ^  0 the probability 
of a full collision on F  is 0(2~2k).
Proof: Let j  be such that 6Ri ^  0 but for all i > j  of the same parity (even 
or odd), 5Rl =  0. Suppose, without loss of generality, that j  is even (the case 
when j  is odd is very similar). In otherwords, we are assuming that given two 
different inputs and for some even j , 8Ri ^  0  but for all i < j  and for all odd 
k < t + 2, SR* = SRk = 0.
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Since for all odd i < t  + 2, SR1 = 0, we learn that if i > 2 is odd, then
0 =  61?
= 6fi{Ri- 1)® 5T i- 3 e S R i~2 
= 5/i( ^ - 1)©5T,_ 3
Therefore, Sfi(R l~1) — S T Let a “rare event” be an event which happens 
with probability 2~k. If i — 1 <  j ,  then S f^ R 1-1) — STi_ 3 , we either must have 
a rare event, specifically that SRz~l ^  0 but the random function outputs a 
pre-specified difference, or SRl~l = 0 .  If i — 1 > j ,  then by our choice of j ,  
5Rl~1 =  0. Therefore, for all even i — 1  /  j  and i — 1 ^ 0 ,  SRl~ l =  0, or two 
rare events must occur. We also know that SR° =  0, because
0 =  SR1
= Sfi(R°) © SL°,
so Sfi(R°) =  8L°. Again, this can only occur without a rare event if SR° — 0.
If none of these rare events occur, then 5L° = 0, and STi- 3  =  0 for all odd
2  < i < t + 2  other than j  — 2 .
Furthermore, if i is even such that SR1 — 0 and SRl~2 =  0, then we can
conclude that STi- 3  =  Sfi(Rz~1) © SRl~2 — 0, by the above deduction, and
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because i — 1  is odd.
Thus we have learned that for most i, STi — 0. The exceptions are for 
i G { j  — 3, j  — 2, j  — l , t  — 1 ,t}. For those, we still know something:
• Since 5R? =  5fj{R?~l )® 5W ~2@5Tj-3 , and 5R?~l =  5R?~2 =  0, we know 
STj- 3  -  SRj .
• Since 0 =  8Ri+l = 5 fj+i(W )® 5W ~1®8Tj^2, we know 5Tj- 2  =  5 fj+i(W ).
• Since 0 =  8R?+2 = S f j ^ i R ^ 1) © 8Ri © 8T j- 1 , we know 5Tj_ 1 =  5RR
We also know that 8L° =  0 since 8L° =  8R1 ® 5fi(R°)  (except if j  — 0, 
which we will handle as a special case.)
Note that because the two output halves are equal, this lets us conclude that 
5Tt =  0 and that 5Tt~ 1 =  0. Recall that:
0 =  <5fl0 ©<5T,e ®^To<(® 5 / 2 (fi1 )®<5/4(JJ3 ) ® . . . © (5/2 lt/2 j+2 (R2Lt/2J+1)
0 =  6L° ® 5Tto © 5Tev ® Sh(R °)  ® 6 f3(R2) ® . . .  ® 6 / 2 l«+i)/2 j+i(R 2L(,+1)/2i)
In one of these two equations, both 5Tt and 5Tt~ 1 appear (the one for which 
Tte or Tt0 is nonzero); in the other, only 5Tt does. All other terms come out 
to zero; in one equation, only <5Tj_ 3  and 5Tj- 1 are not guaranteed to be 0, but 
these are equal to each other. In the other, <5Tj_ 2 is not guaranteed to be 0, and 
neither is / J+i(RJ), which appears in the same equation, but STj- 2  =
46
and therefore XOR to 0. Thus, from the equation in which Tt appears alone, we 
conclude STt = 0 , and from the other one we then conclude that STt- \  — 0 .
We now break the proof into five cases: j  > 4, j  = 3, j  =  2, j  =  1  and j  =  0.
case i: j  > 4. If we assume that j  > 4 then we know that both STq = 0 and 
ST-1 =  0. One of those two terms includes one of T7 - 3  and T j- 1 , but not both, 
and all other tweaks included must remain unchanged. Therefore, both STj-3 
and STj- 1  are 0. But we know that 0 ^ SR? =  STj-1 , so this is a contradiction; 
thus j  < 4.
case ii: j  =  3. If j  = 3, then STq — ST2 , but all other even-numbered tweaks 
are unchanged. Since T2  is not included in To, we note that all the other terms in 
Tq are known to have no difference between the two queries. Therefore, STq — 0 
and so 8 T2  = 0, which then implies that SR3  — 0, which is a contradiction; thus 
j  < 3.
case iii: j  = 2. If j  = 2, then ST-1 =  5T\, but all other odd-numbered tweaks 
are unchanged. Since T\ is not part of T_ 1 , we can conclude that ST-1 =  0, 
which is a contradiction; thus j  < 2 .
case iv: j  = 1 . If j  = 1 , then we can conclude that SL° =  STq, via a similar 
deduction. Because all even-numbered tweaks are 0, we get STq =  0 =  SL°. Since 
5R° = 0, we know that SR1 = SL° © Sfi(R°) =  0, which is a contradiction; thus
j  < 1-
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case v: j  - 0. If j  = 0, we know that ST = 0 for all i. Since 0 -  SR2 =  
6 f 2 (R 1) © SR° © ST- 1  and ST- 1  =  SR1 — 0, we get that SR° = 0, which is a 
contradiction.
Therefore, if two distinct queries are such that either for all odd i < t +  2  or 
for all even i < t +  2 , SR1 =  0 , but there is some j  < t +  2  such that SRi 0  
then at least two rare events must occur in order for an overall collision to 
occur: therefore, the probability of a collision in this case is at most 0(2~2k). 
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.4. ■
Since in cases 1  and 3, the probability of a collision is at most 0 ( 2~2k), 
and the probability of a collision in case 2  is 0, the overall probability of a full 
collision given two unique queries is at most 0(2~2k). This completes the proof 
of Theorem 5.1 ■
Now that we have proven that for any pair of distinct queries F  does not 
allow full collisions with probability greater than 0(2~2k), we must also prove 
that for any pair of distinct queries, the probability of a collision on the right is 
at most 0(2~k).
Theorem  5.2 On any pair of distinct inputs, the probability that F  will produce 
the same output on the right in each is 0(2~k).
Proof: Assume without loss of generality that t is odd; if not, the proof is 
similar. If t is odd, then whenever two queries lead to a collision on the right,
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we have
SL° © STt © STev © <5/i(-R°) © . . .  © 5ft+2(Rt+1) =  0
If for some even i < t +  2, SR1 0, then the probability of a collision occurring
is 2~k.
Therefore we can assume that for all even i < t + 2 , SR1 =  0. I f 2 < i < £  +  2 
is even, then 0 =  SR1 ~  S fi(R l~l )®SLl~1 ®STi- 3  =  Sfi(R l~1)® 5T i-3 @5 R l~2, so 
Sfi(R l~1) =  STi-3 ) since SR l ~ 2 — 0. Thus, either SRl~l =  0  or this equation is 
true with probability 2 ~k. Therefore we can assume in all such cases, SR2 - 1  =  0;
Since we can assume that SRl~l =  0 then Sfi(R l~l ) =  0, so STi- 3  =  0. Thus 
we know that all the odd-numbered tweaks up to Tt- 2  do not change between 
the two queries, including the value To. But similarly, if 1 < i < t +  1 is odd 
then STi- 3  = 0 .
If a collision occurs, we also have that STt =  SRt+2 =  Sft{Rt+l) © SR1 © 
STt- !  = 5Tt-! .
We have been able to deduce that STi =  0 f o r — 1 < i < t — 2. We have 
included Tt in To and T_i in such a way that regardless of t mod 4, Tt is involved 
in one that T t- 1 is not involved in, or vice-versa. Since STq =  ST - 1 , this allows 
us to conclude that both STt and STt- \  are 0. Thus proving that the two queries 
are actually the same.
Therefore, assuming that the two queries are distinct at least one rare event 
must occur in order to produce a collision on the right half of the output. There-
49
fore, the probability of such a collision is at most 0 ( 2  k). ■
Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2 allow us to prove our constructed F  has the 
properties enumerated in Theorem 1.2.
T heorem  5.3 F is a function such that for q 2k queries, the probability of 
having I = O(k) indices such that Ri1 =  Ri2 — Ri3 = ...Rit is negligible, (where 
Rij is the right half of the j  ’th output of F ), and on q distinct inputs F  has only 
a negligible probability of a full collision on its outputs.
Proof: The proof follows from Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2. We can once 
again apply the principle of deferred decisions, and furthermore, q <^2k queries 
will not allow a non-negligible probability for the failure of either condition. The 
reasoning is parallel to that given in the proof of Theorem 3.1. ■
From Theorem 5.3 we can finally prove that CPA-secure tweakable block- 
ciphers that allow for tweaks of arbitrary length exist. Let F  be the function 
described in the final construction of this section and let E  be a regular four- 
round Feistel cipher, then E  o F  is a tweakable blockcipher CPA secure against 
exponential adversaries that allows for tweaks of arbitrary size.
T heorem  5.4 E  o F  is a tweakable blockcipher with t tweaks that is secure 
against any exponential adversary with at most g <  2  ^ queries, where E  is a 
four-round Feistel cipher and F is a t +  2-round tweaked Feistel cipher described 
in Section 5.2.1.1.
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This follows from Theorem 5.3 and Theorem 1.2. Note that E  o F  requires 
a total of t +  6  rounds.
5.3 Longer T w eaks w ith  C C A  secu rity
In this section, we prove the existence of CCA-secure tweakable blockcipher 
that allow for arbitrary length tweaks. Let F  be a t +  2  round tweaked Feistel 
construction described in Section 5.2.1.1. Let F 1 be a t +  2 round tweaked 
Feistel construction which is equivalent to the inverse of F  except that the 
random round functions used in F' are newly chosen at random. Let E  be a 
regular four-round Feistel cipher. We prove that F 'o E o F  is CCA-secure against 
exponential adversaries.
T heo rem  5.5 F' o E  o F is a tweakable blockcipher with t tweaks that is CCA- 
secure against any unbounded adversary with at most g < 2 fc queries, where E  
is a four-round Feistel cipher, F ' is the inverse of the F  described above, with 
new independent round functions.
Proof: The proof follows from Theorem 5.3 and Theorem 1.3. ■
Notice that our CCA-secure construction, F' o E  o F  requires 2(t +  2) +  4 =  
2 £ +  8  rounds.
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5.4  M in im ality  o f F
In this section, we show that F  is minimal in terms of the number of rounds 
needed in order to meet the properties required by Theorem 1.2.
L em m a 5.5 If F  is a Feistel-based blockcipher incorporating t tweaks, and F  
has n < t  + 2 rounds, then certain pairs of queries can lead to an overall collision 
on the output of F  with probability 0(2~k).
Proof: Without loss of generality, the location for each tweak can be expressed 
in terms of compound locations based on the locations £ i , . . . , £ n (since Cq 
and 7^ o can be simulated away). Let l b , . . . ,  be the compound locations for 
T \ , . . .  ,T t , respectively. Let T' be defined as the portion of T made up of only 
£ 3, . . . ,  £ n, for each i.
Since n < t +  2 , there are fewer than t locations in £ 3 , . . .  , £ n. Therefore, 
there will be some linear dependency among the T' values, that is, there will be 
some i such that for some 5 C {1, ...n} such that
Therefore, by Lemma 5.2, such a construction is insecure; the compound 
location Y lje S ^ j  consist of only locations from C\ and £ 2 .
Note that C\ and £ 2  on their own can be thought of as equivalent to C\ +  TZq 
and £ 2  +  £q, respectively. Those constructions fall to the attack given by Crump
jes
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et al. in Lemma 4.9 [7]. C\ +  £ 2  can be thought of as equivalent to £ 0  +  £ 1  + £ 2  
which is the same as 7 ^1 . 5  +  7 ^ 2  > which falls to the attack given by Crump et al. 
in Corollary 4.10 [7]. ■
Therefore F  (and F' presented in Section 5.3) is round-optimal in our model.
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L° R°
F igu re 5.1: An illustration of F 
which contains six half blocks of 
tweak (t = 6 ).
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Crump et al. constructed tweakable blockciphers from Feistel ciphers by XOR- 
ing tweaks directly in the datastream and proved the security of their con­
structions against polynomial adversaries [7]. In this thesis, we extend their 
model and construct tweakable blockcipher from Feistel ciphers which are se­
cure against adversaries allowed unlimited computations, but bounded by an 
exponential number of queries.
We proved that seven rounds are sufficient to construct a chosen plaintext 
secure (CPA) tweakable blockcipher. We then showed that ten rounds are suf­
ficient to construct a chosen ciphertext secure (CCA) tweakable blockcipher. 
We are the first to prove the security of tweakable blockciphers against a com­
putationally unbounded adversary allowed q <C 2k queries, where k is half the 
input size. Our results match the best security results proven for regular block­
ciphers [2 2 ].
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We also address the problem of incorporating tweaks of arbitrary length into 
a tweakable blockcipher. We proved that six rounds plus one round per tweak 
is sufficient for CPA security, and eight rounds plus two rounds per tweak is 
sufficient for CCA security.
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